I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteen Illinois Supreme Court decisions in the area of substantive criminal law' handed down during the Survey year suggest both the continuation of a trend and a seemingly small, yet significant departure from decisions in recent years. The continuing trend is the court's preference for granting review of, and reversing, lower court rulings that favor the defense, at least in substan-tive criminal law. For example, in the noncapital cases examined in last year's Survey, 2 eight were before the supreme court following defense victories in lower courts; 3 two resulted from lower court judgments for the State.' In all but one of this Survey period's fourteen cases, 5 the defendant prevailed before the lower tribunal.
The significant departure presented by these cases is the unanimity previously unseen on the supreme court in recent years. There were three dissents in the noncapital cases in last year's Survey, all in cases wherein the majority sided with the State. 6 Only two dissents were recorded in the fourteen cases within this year's Survey, 7 both written by Justice Ben Miller. In each case, a majority of the supreme court held for the defense. ' One possible explanation for this new display of unanimity is Justice Seymour Simon's recent retirement; during his tenure on the court, Justice Simon developed a reputation as "the great dissenter." 9 Whatever the reason, the court's unanimity, coupled with its reluctance to overturn lower courts' decisions favoring the State, demonstrates that the court appears to view itself with increasing frequency as the court of last resort to halt what it perceives, rightly or wrongly, to be the lower courts' expansion of defendants' rights.
In legislation, the General Assembly defined new crimes and en- hanced the penalties for others,' 0 notwithstanding the almost epidemic increase in prison population over the past decade.' Much of the new legislation was drug-related, including a new Class X offense for possession of large quantities of controlled substances. 2 Other new crimes concern sexual abuse of children and bodily harm to the elderly. 1 3 The legislature also revised two statutes that the supreme court ruled unconstitutional during the Survey year.' 4 
II. CASE LAW A. General Provisions and Principles of Criminal Liability
1. Rights of the Defendant: Multiple Convictions and Multiple Sentences The Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Segara' 5 that multiple convictions for multiple acts of criminal sexual assault against the same victim, during a single episode, do not violate the defendant's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy 6 if the acts are distinct; the resulting sentences, however, must run concurrently. 17 In Segara, the defendant had known the victim for several years, but they had no prior sexual relationship." 8 On the night in question, the defendant forced his way into the victim's apartment, physically abused her, raped her and forced her to perform fellatio. 19 At a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. 20 The appellate court va-
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Criminal Law cated all but one conviction and affirmed the sentence, but it remanded for clarification of which count remained. 2 ' The supreme court granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal, which sought a remand for resentencing due to the vacatur of the other seven convictions. 22 The unanimous court reviewed the cases on which the appellate court grounded the vacaturs, including People v. Cox.
2 3 The Cox court held that when a defendant commits multiple criminal acts against the same victim within a short time, only one conviction and one sentence are proper. 24 Cox was modified, however, in People v. King, 25 which held that multiple convictions for multiple criminal acts against the same victim are permissible if the offenses are different and the sentences run concurrently. 26 Thus, if the defendant's offenses here constituted distinct acts, multiple convictions with concurrent sentences would be proper. 27 Emphasizing the brutality of sexual assault and its lasting impact on the victim, the court had little difficulty in holding that each of the defendant's acts of rape was a separate act. 28 The court also found support in the rape statute's wording, which indicated a clear legislative intent that each act of rape be punished. 29 In light 14(a)(2) (1987) (bodily harm to the victim), 12-14(a)(3) (threats or endangerment to life of victim or other person), and 12-14(a)(4) (assault during the course of the commission or attempted commission of another felony). The court merged the first two charges during sentencing. To permit a defendant to rape an individual several times over a period of time in the same place with little or no break between each act deprecates the heinous and violent nature of each act and the effect each act has upon the victim.... Rape is unlike other offenses: with each act, the victim's psychological constitution and most intimate part of her being have been violently invaded.
Id.
29. Id. The court stated that "although the legislature did not intend for defendant of this intent, the court concluded that the two convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault did not constitute double jeopardy. 30 Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate court's vacatur of six of the eight convictions but reinstated another. 31 Lastly, the court declared that the sentences must run concurrently. 32
2. Justifiable Use of Force: Jury Instructions on Necessity Defense
In People v. Janik, 33 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the quantum of evidence required to justify jury instructions on the affirmative defense of necessity 34 against the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. 35 The court ruled that the trial court properly denied such jury instructions when the defendant claimed simultaneously that he was justified in leaving the scene of an accident and he was unaware that he had been in a collision. 36 While driving home after drinking at a local tavern, the defendant struck and killed a pedestrian. 37 The defendant did not stop; he drove the four blocks to his home and told his wife that someone had thrown something at the car. 38 A police officer who witnessed the accident followed the defendant home and questioned him; the defendant told the officer that he thought he had hit a to receive several convictions for each act, the General Assembly did go to great lengths to ensure that each act of rape, however committed, is punished. " 
mailbox. 39
A jury convicted the defendant of leaving the scene of an accident and of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") but found him not guilty of driving with a blood alcohol level of. 10 or more.'° Although the appellate court unanimously affirmed the DUI conviction, it reversed the conviction for leaving the scene because the trial judge refused the defendant's request for jury instructions on the necessity defense to that charge. 4 ' The supreme court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 4 2
The unanimous court, in an opinion by Justice Ryan, reviewed both convictions. 4 3 First, it considered the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the necessity defense." The defendant asserted that he left the scene of the accident because he felt endangered, believing that someone had thrown a mailbox at his car. 45 This belief entitled him to invoke the necessity defense, he maintained, because these circumstances forced him to choose between leaving the scene of the accident or risking injury to himself."
The court rejected the defendant's argument because the necessity defense requires that a defendant must have chosen to violate the law. 4 7 The court emphasized that the necessity defense is a 39. Id. at 396, 537 N.E.2d at 759. 40. Id. at 393-97, 537 N.E.2d at 757-59. Illinois law requires that when an accident results in injury or death, a driver must stop and remain at the scene to give information and aid. ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-401(a) (1987) . Illinois law also prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id. para. 11-501(a)(2). Although neither the defendant's wife nor the officer-witness noticed signs of intoxication, another officer smelled a moderate odor of alcohol when the defendant returned to the accident scene. 127 Ill. 2d at 395-96, 537 N.E.2d at 758-59. The defendant told the second officer that he had hit a mailbox and that he had been drinking, whereupon the officer arrested him for driving under the influence. Id. The defendant subsequently performed poorly on two field sobriety tests. IM. at 396-97, 537 N.E.2d at 759. The permissible blood alcohol concentration is 0.10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. ll-501(a)(l) (1987 balancing test, a "choice between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are unavailable." 4 The duty to stop after an accident arises only when the driver knows an accident has occurred. 49 Thus, the defendant had no duty to stop if, as he asserted, he was unaware of the accident. 5 0 Absent the duty to stop, he could not have chosen to breach that duty. 51 Consequently, because the defendant's description of the events did not involve a choice between evils, the trial court's denial of jury instructions on the necessity defense was proper. 5 2
The court next considered whether the State had proved the DUI charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 3 The defendant argued that evidence of the blood testing's unreliability, the circumstances surrounding the field sobriety tests, and testimony that he did not appear intoxicated raised reasonable doubt of his guilt. 5 4 The court was unconvinced, observing that an arresting officer's believable testimony alone will satisfy the State's burden of proof for a DUI conviction, and the State had provided such evidence. 
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The defendant was indicted for murder under the 1985 homicide statute 59 for a killing that occurred on May 1, 1987. 6° He claimed that the murder indictment was invalid because the revised statute, which did not include the offense of "murder," became effective on January 5, 1987.6' The State countered that because the statute contained no express effective date, it was effective on July 1, 1987, making the indictment under the prior law proper. 62 The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the indictment; the supreme court permitted the State's direct appeal. 63 Chief Justice Moran's opinion first considered the defendant's claim that the statute became effective on January 5, 1987, the signing date. 6 ' The court rejected this argument because it conflicted with the statute's wording. 65 The court then considered the defendant's claim that the application provision had to be an effective date provision to avoid conflicts between retroactive application and ex post facto prohibitions. 66 The court observed that a 58. Id 67 Here, the revised statute required defendants to prove mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, shifting the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. 68 Because the revised statute decreased the degree of proof needed to convict, the court concluded that retroactive application would violate ex post facto prohibitions. 69 The court commented that effective date provisions, like ex post facto prohibitions, are designed to give citizens a fair warning of a particular type of conduct's consequences. 70 If the revised statute's effective date were January 1, 1987, the revision would not provide a fair warning and thus would violate both the ex post facto prohibition and the purpose of effective date provisions. 7 ' Accordingly, the court severed the application provision from the body of the statute and stated that the revised statute would be applied prospectively from its effective date. 72 The court began its effort to ascertain this date by observing that a statute's effective date is determined by its date of passage, i.e., the date of "final legislative action prior to the presentation to the Governor. 73 Because the bill passed in December, 74 the statute fell within the general rule that a bill passed after June 30 becomes effective the following July 1. 75 Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the conversation, claiming that it was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of the eavesdropping statute.
8 7 The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the officer had not "altered" the telephone. 8 At trial, the police officer gave a verbatim account of the overheard conversation, and a jury convicted the defendant of both charges. 89 The appellate court ruled that the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was reversible error because the evidence was obtained in violation of the eavesdropping statute's plain meaning. 9 " The supreme court granted the State's petition to appeal. 91 Justice Miller, for the unanimous court, observed that the threshold question was whether the police officer had converted the extension telephone into an "eavesdropping device" by placing his hand over the receiver. 92 The court first reviewed the statute's history 93 and then examined cases decided under the statute that have held an extension telephone is not an eavesdropping device conspirator had committed arson at the defendant's office. Id. at 484, 539 N.E.2d at 1240. The co-conspirator was also indicted for arson and conspiracy, but he testified that the State's Attorney offered probation for his testimony. The court reiterated the rules of statutory construction: "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature" and to look for this intent in the statute's language, "which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. The court emphasized too that any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be construed in the accused's favor. Id.
93. Id. at 487, 539 N.E.2d at 1241. The 1961 act applied only to "any device employing electricity." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 206.1 (1961). The court noted that the legislature had modified the statute to delete the criterion that the device "employ electricity" to bring the statute in line with Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), which had held that "the monitoring of a conversation on an extension telephone does not constitute an interception of the conversation or the use of a device employing electricity to hear a conversation." Shinkle, 128 Ill. 2d at 487, 539 N.E.2d at 1241 (quoting Rathburn, 355 U.S. at 111).
for the purposes of the statute if it is not "functionally altered." 94 In this case, the officer had not made deletions or additions to the telephone mechanism. 95 Thus, because "functional alteration" is required for a violation of the eavesdropping statute, the officer's placing his hand over the mouthpiece of the telephone in question did not violate the statute.
96 Accordingly, the evidence was admissible, so the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was proper.
97
The defendant also argued that the legislature intended that a listening device would be considered an "eavesdropping device" for statutory purposes whenever its user planned to eavesdrop. 9 Because the statute contained no language with respect to intent, however, the court found the defendant's interpretation unwarranted. 99 The court then affirmed the trial court's admission of the evidence, reversing the appellate court's contrary ruling.co In Gaines, the defendant's mother and brother permitted the police to use an extension telephone to overhear their conversations with the defendant. 88 Ill. 2d at 360-61, 430 N.E.2d at 1055. The Gaines defendant claimed that the conversations could not be admitted as evidence because the officer had violated the eavesdropping statute. Id. at 359, 430 N.E.2d at 1055. The court rejected his argument, holding that "the statute is directed against the use of devices other than the telephone itself when the latter has not been functionally altered." Id. at 363, 430 N.E.2d at 1056. In a later case, the court held that an extension telephone without a speaking element violated the statute because it was "functionally altered." People v. 102. An included offense is one that "[i]s established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-9(a) (1987).
103. 126 Ill. 2d at 183-84, 533 N.E.2d at 700. Residential burglary is an offense that is predicated on knowing entry with intent to commit a felony or theft in the building.
In Schmidt, the defendant was apprehended on the rear porch of a house, possessing jewelry and coins taken from inside the home. 10 4 The defendant claimed he had not actually entered the house but had knocked at the door looking for work, when he saw a man run out the rear door, dropping the jewelry and coins that the defendant then picked up. 0 5 A jury found the defendant guilty of both residential burglary and theft. 0 6 The appellate court, however, reversed the convictions as inconsistent and remanded for a new trial on all charges.
1 0 7 The supreme court granted the State leave to appeal.' 08 In an opinion authored by Justice Ward, the unanimous court affirmed the residential burglary conviction.°9 The court then reversed the theft conviction, stating that a defendant charged with a single offense can be convicted of an uncharged offense only if it is a lesser included offense of the charged offense.' '° Hence, the court In People v. Zeisler," 2 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant could assert a post-conviction challenge to his aggravated arson conviction on the ground that the statute had been found void ab initio, even though he had not raised the issue earlier. 113 The defendant was charged with attempted murder" 4 and aggravated arson" 5 for a setting a fire in his home in which his wife suffered severe burns." 6 The jury acquitted him on the attempted murder charge but convicted him of aggravated arson. of direct appeals were unsuccessful," 1 I and the defendant filed two post-conviction petitions. 119 The first alleged that the defendant's wife recanted her testimony, which would entitle him to a reversal; the other demanded vacatur of the conviction because the aggravated arson statute had been declared unconstitutional in an earlier decision. 120 The lower court vacated the conviction, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the statute was inapplicable because it was void ab initio.
21
The supreme court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.1 22 The unanimous court, speaking through Justice Cunningham, rejected the State's contention that the United States Supreme Court had invalidated the void ab initio doctrine in Pope v. llinois 123 and denied the State's request for a remand to determine harmless error under the admittedly unconstitutional statute. The court distinguished Pope, in which a jury instruction rather than a statute was found unconstitutional. 25 When a statute is found unconstitutional, the void ab initio doctrine requires vacatur of any conviction that resulted from it.' 26 The court further observed that the State may prosecute a defendant retroactively under an amended version of a void statute 118. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. Id. After the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the appellate court for a determination of the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the defendant's home. 11-20(b) .
134. Sequoia Books, 127 111. 2d at 276, 537 N.E.2d at 305. Between 1982 and 1985, the State filed forty criminal charges involving 1500 publications against the defendant store and its employees. Id. The store owners were found guilty of eight of the nine declared a public nuisance and to enjoin its use. 3 ' The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional as a prior restraint on freedom of expression. 1 36 The trial court denied the motion and granted a temporary injunction. 137 The State later petitioned for a rule to show cause, claiming that the defendants had violated the injunction terms by selling obscene materials.
13
At the permanent injunction hearing, the trial court held that the defendants had violated the obscenity statute. 139 In accordance with the nuisance abatement statute, the court enjoined the use of the building but said that the store could remain open upon posting a forfeitable bond. 1 "' The defendants posted the bond and appealed.' 41 On remand, the trial court revoked the bond and dissolved the stay because the defendants had violated the bond conditions by selling obscene materials. 142 The appellate court reversed, finding that the permanent injunction was a prior restraint on the defendant's freedom of expression and that the statutory procedure was constitutionally flawed. 143 Before the supreme court, the defendants argued that the standard of review was strict scrutiny" 4 because the final injunction order constituted a prior restraint on their freedom of speech, makcharges against them; in 1986, the store owners were charged with and found guilty of four more obscenity charges. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Clark, agreed that the standard of review for prior restraint on pure speech is strict scrutiny.'' The court observed, however, that under O'Brien, a state may impose restrictions when both speech and nonspeech elements are present if the state acts within its constitutional powers and if the restriction furthers a substantial state interest." 2 Here, the statute met these criteria. The State had the authority under its police power to abate nuisances, and it had a substantial interest in the quality of life in the community. The court objected, however, to the statute's "incidental restriction" on protected speech, finding that it was not the least restrictive means available to adVance the State's interest." 54 155 Additionally, by restricting obscene, unprotected speech, the statute impermissibly interfered with protected speech sold from the same location. 156 Furthermore, the statute effectively and improperly discriminated against bookstore owners in particular.
57
The court observed that the statute's effectiveness lay in its ability to prevent distribution of obscene materials by establishing an economic risk in addition to the penal sanctions. 58 The State had not shown, however, that the penal sanctions were inadequate to protect State interests. 59 Moreover, the statute discouraged the sale of protected, but sexually explicit material, not just sale of obscene materials. 16 This, the court concluded, amounted to "overkill."' ' 61 The court also rejected the State's contention of its substantial interest in the effects of obscenity sales on the neighborhood. 62 Although the court acknowledged that this State interest was vital, other "less draconian" means were available to achieve this end. 1 63 Accordingly, the statute failed to pass the least restrictive means prong of the O'Brien test; thus, it was unconstitutional when used to enjoin use of a building solely on the basis of on-site obscenity violations. 1 6 rights such as free speech, the State must show that the statute represents the "least drastic means" of doing so. Id In a case involving a driver who attempted to hide cocaine by pouring it onto his car floor, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the driver had used the car to "facilitate" violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 7 0 and thus the vehicle was subject to The court also declined to address the constitutionality of the ex parte preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order provisions in isolation, relying on the general rule that a finding of unconstitutionality in one part of a statute invalidates the whole unless that part can be severed without affecting the rest. Id at 292, 537 N.E.2d at 312.
The court ruled that the invalidation of the bond and closure provisions made the ex parte provisions "pointless." Id. at 292, 537 N.E.2d at 312- white powder, which testing later revealed to be cocaine.' 74 After Smith pled guilty to a charge of possession of a controlled substance, the State filed suit for forfeiture of the vehicle. 175 The trial court denied the State's petition and released the car, ruling that forfeiture in this case would not be consistent with the statute's legislative intent. 1 7 6 The appellate court affirmed, grounding its decision on People v. One 1985 Chevrolet Camaro, 7 7 which held on similar facts that under the in pari materia doctrine, the statute was inapplicable. 178 The State successfully petitioned for leave to appeal. 1 79 Chief Justice Moran's opinion for the unanimous court first corrected Smith's and the appellate court's misuse of the in pari materia doctrine, noting that the doctrine applies only when a statute's language is ambiguous.1 80 Use of the doctrine was inapt in this case because the language of the statute was "clear and unambiguous."' 181 The court emphasized that the key word in interpreting the Controlled Substances Act was "facilitate," which it defined as "mak[ing] easier or less difficult."' 1 8 2 Using the car floor to hide the cocaine made Smith's continued possession easier and thus brought the car within the purview of the forfeiture provision. 8 3 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial and appellate court decisions and remanded for a forfeiture order. cense, the standard of review was the rational basis test. 194 The defendant contended that to determine the statute's basis, the court could consider only those state interests explicitly declared in the statute; the State countered that the court was obliged to consider any rational basis, even if not expressed in the statute.' 9 After examining the statute in its entirety, the court identified the state interest as the "safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles."' 196 The court then focused on the reasonableness of the relationship between this interest and the statute's underlying purpose.' 97 Remarking that the defendant's crimes did not involve a motor vehicle, the court concluded that not only was there no reasonable relationship between his crimes and the statute's purpose, there was no relationship whatsoever.' 98 Lastly, the court examined the statute as a method of furthering the State's interest in safe and legal vehicle operation. 99 Because the offenses enumerated in the statute did not involve motor vehicles, and because there was no discernible basis for choosing the listed offenses rather than others, the court concluded that the statute was invalid. 2 20 5 Consequently, he would uphold the provision as constitutional. 2 6 Justice Miller also cautioned that the majority's decision was overly broad because it invalidated the entire revocation provision, not just the portion concerning the offenses the defendant had committed. 2°7
Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle: Penalty Constitutional
In People v. Bryant, 2 0 the supreme court held that the sanction for possession of a stolen vehicle does not violate the due process and proportionate penalties guarantees of the Illinois Constitution.
The defendant in Bryant was convicted at a bench trial for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and he received a three-and-onehalf year sentence. 210 On appeal, the defendant first challenged the constitutionality of the sentencing provision. 21 The appellate court vacated the conviction, holding the sentencing provision unconstitutional because the sanction for possession of a stolen vehicle was harsher than that for the lesser included offense of theft or for organized motor vehicle theft. 21 The State appealed as of right. 2 " 3 The unanimous court, speaking through Chief Justice Moran, held that the defendant could raise the constitutionality issue on appeal. 21 ' 4 The court rejected the State's claim that the defendant had waived his right to raise this issue on appeal by not mentioning it at the trial court level, and it reaffirmed that a party may raise at any time the issue of a statute's unconstitutionality. The defendant's challenge to the statute was twofold. First, the statute created two classes of possessors of stolen motor vehicles: individuals and organized motor vehicle thieves. 6 The supreme court concluded that this distinction was false because the statute indicated an unambiguous intent to apply to all possessors of stolen vehicles, whether organized or not. 217 Thus, the court held no unconstitutional disparity existed between the two groups in the severity of punishment. 1 8
The defendant also argued that the classification of the offense at issue as a Class 2 felony meant that the penalty was constitutionpushing a motorcycle when they were stopped by police. Id. at 452, 539 N.E.2d at 1223. The police checked the Vehicle Identification Number, discovered that the motorcycle belonged to a third person, and arrested the two men for possession of a stolen vehicle. ally disproportionate to that of the greater offense of theft, a Class 3 felony. 21 9 Possession of a stolen motor vehicle was a lesser included offense of theft, he contended, making the harsher sanction violative of the due process and proportionality clauses of the state constitution. 220 Remarking that the judiciary typically defers to the legislature in matters of penal sanctions, 22 ' the court concluded that the incremental changes in the severity of the penalty for possession of a stolen motor vehicle signified a legislative intent to differentiate between that offense and ordinary theft. 222 Accordingly, the court held that increases in the penalty were reasonably designed to decrease the number of incidents of an increasingly frequent crime and thus did not violate the Illinois Constitution. 223
E. Sentencing Statutes 1. Parole Term: Unserved Portion of Maximum Indeterminate
Sentence Included
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Faheem-El v. Klincar, 224 determined that the purpose of the 1978 amendment to the sentencing statute was to extend Department of Corrections control over an inmate/parolee to include both the mandatory parole term and any unserved portion of a maximum indeterminate sentence. 225 Thus, parole terms were not limited to the statutorily-mandated three or 219. Id. at 454, 539 N.E.2d at 1224. As a Class 2 felony, possession of a stolen vehicle carried a three to seven year sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(5) (1987). By contrast, theft of property valued at more than three hundred dollars was a Class 3 felony, which mandates only a two to five year prison sentence. Id. para. 1005-8-1(a)(6). For the revisions to the sentencing provisions of the theft statute during the Survey year, see infra notes 321-25.
220. 128 Ill. 2d at 456-57, 539 N.E.2d at 1225. 221. Courts apply the rational basis test to penal sanctions, holding them unconstitutional only if they are not rationally related to correcting a danger to the community. See supra note 194 for the rational basis test.
222. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 457-58, 539 N.E.2d at 1225-26. In 1977, the crime was a Cass 4 felony; in 1979, the legislature added a provision making a subsequent offense a Class 3 felony. Id. at 457, 539 N.E.2d at 1225. In 1983, subsequent offenses became Class 2 felonies, and the first offense became a Class 3 felony. Id. In 1985, the statute made the offense a Class 2 felony for both the first and any subsequent convictions. Id. The court noted that these changes corresponded to the increasing frequency of car theft. five years. 22 6 In Faheem-El, the petitioner had been convicted of murder in 1973, sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of thirty to ninety years, and paroled in October, 1983.227 Three-and-one-half years later, the petitioner was arrested and charged with delivery of thirty dollars' worth of cocaine.
22 " The Prisoner Review Board issued a parole violator warrant, preventing the petitioner's release on bail. 229 At a subsequent parole revocation hearing, the Board found that the petitioner had violated his parole, and it ordered his return to prison. The petitioner filed a petition in the Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, 2 3 ' claiming that the parole revocation was improper because his parole term had expired automatically in October, 1986, three years after his release from prison.
2 32 The petitioner argued that the Parole Board's revocation power did not extend beyond the statutory parole term of three years; once that term expired, the Board had no power to imprison him. 23 3 The Board maintained that, for an indeterminate sentence, the parole term does not begin until the expiration of the maximum term to which a defendant has been sentenced, which in this case was eighty years after the petitioner's release on parole. Chief Justice Moran's opinion for an unanimous court began by noting that the court must grant a habeas petition if a prisoner has satisfied the underlying judgment on which it is based; consequently, the court had to determine whether the petitioner had satisfied his 1973 sentence.
2 35 The court remarked that the sentencing statute defined length of parole in terms of the indeterminate sentence, including the mininwmr and maximum terms for an offense, rather than merely its parole provisions. This, however, had the unwelcome effect of releasing prisoners into society without supervision if they had served the full maximum sentence. 243 To remedy this oversight, the statute was amended to require an additional time period for supervision after release for those who had served their entire sentence in prison. 244 This change assured that all prisoners, particularly those who had not merited an early release, would be under State control for a period of time after their release from prison. 245 The court found this change indicative of a legislative intent to extend, rather than to limit, the length of time for state control. 2 46 Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to discharge merely by having served his three years of parole. 
Supervision: Not Constitutionally Required for Certain Repeat Offenders
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court twice addressed constitutional challenges to the sentencing provisions for drunk drivers who previously entered guilty pleas to reckless driving charges. In the first case, the court was able to avoid the defendant's constitutionality challenge due to deficiencies in the record and in the judgment itself. 248 In the second case, with a more complete trial record, the court held that the statute did not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees. 249 in People v. Kuhn, 250 the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and disobeying a traffic control device; he requested court supervision. 25 A few years previously, the defendant had been charged with DUI, but the charge had been reduced to reckless driving. 252 The applicable sentencing statute, however, prohibited court supervision for DUI convictions if, within five years prior to the current charge, the defendant had pled guilty to a reckless driving charge in the course of a plea bargain."' Before his sentencing, the defendant asked the court to declare the statute unconstitutional. 254 The trial court held that the statute violated the equal protection provisions of the Illinois and United States Constitutions and continued the case. 255 The State appealed directly to the supreme court. 256 The unanimous court, speaking through Chief Justice Moran, first examined the record for the current charge to find indications that the defendant had plea bargained in 1983 for his earlier reckless driving charge. 257 Altlough the defendant claimed that he had brought the earlier charge's file to his second trial, the file was not contained in the record for the second offense, and thus it could not be considered on appeal. 258 In addition, although the defendant testified at the second trial that he had been charged with DUI in 1983 and had pled guilty to reckless driving, he had not said specifically that the earlier guilty plea resulted from a plea bargain. 259 Thus, the court concluded that the record was insufficient to support the denial of a supervision order. 2°T he court also questioned its jurisdiction over the appeal. 26 ' Because the trial court had continued the case for status without sentencing the defendant, there was no final order; without a final order, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 262 Rather than simply dismissing the case, the supreme court vacated the trial court's declaration of unconstitutionality and remanded the cause for sentencing. 263 Two months later, the court issued an authoritative ruling on the statute's constitutionality in People v. Eckhardt, 2 M The Eckhardt record revealed a prior plea bargain, solving Kuhn's technical deficiencies. 265 In Eckhardt, the trial court also held the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds 2 6 and again the State appealed directly to the supreme court. 267 Even though the trial court's order was interlocutory, the supreme court ruled that it had jurisdiction pursuant to its supervisory authority. 268 The defendant contended that the statute impermissibly estab- 268. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 149, 535 N.E.2d at 847. The court noted that the parties had not raised the issue of jurisdiction but said that the case was "an appropriate one for lished two classes that the State treated differently. 2 6 9 The unanimous court, speaking through Justice Ryan, first observed that the question presented did not concern either a suspect class or fundamental interest, making the standard of review the rational basis test. 270 The court then remarked that not all statutory distinctions between classes are unconstitutional. 271 Unlike the trial court, the supreme court concluded that the distinction at issue, between those who entered a blind guilty plea to a charge of reckless driving and those who bargained for it, was drawn between two groups whose conduct differed because the charge against the group of plea bargainers likely had been reduced. 272 Consequently, the distinction was permissible because the two groups differed in that the plea bargainers usually committed more serious offenses than those who had been charged initially with reckless driving. 273 The court held the state interest in highway safety sufficient to withstand the defendant's constitutional challenge. 274 The court determined that the statute was intended to exclude from supervision both those who were convicted under the DUI statute and those who had plea bargained to the lesser offense of reckless driving. 275 Thus, for constitutional purposes, those who plea bargain to reckless driving are differently situated from those originally so charged; consequently, the statute does not violate equal protection guarantees because those treated differently are indeed different. 276 Accordingly, the court upheld the statute's constitutionality. 277 
IV. LEGISLATION

A. General Provisions and Principles of Criminal Liability
New Class of Victims for Certain Offenses
The Illinois legislature amended the Criminal Code's general definitions to add the term "institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded person. ' The legislature expanded the potential criminal liability of corporations in three ways. The first permits prosecution of corporations for obscenity and child pornography. 2 8 9 The second permits corporations to be prosecuted for violation of the State Environmental Protection Act. 29 0 The last singles out corporations for maximum fines of fifty thousand dollars or the amount specified in the offense, whichever is greater. 29 '
Solicitation, Solicitation of Murder and Murder for Hire
The General Assembly created two new solicitation offenses and modified an existing one. 292 The revision limits the application of the solicitation statute to offenses other than first degree murder. 293 One new offense is solicitation of murder, which is defined as commanding, requesting, or encouraging another to commit first degree murder. 294 not less than fifteen nor more than thirty years. 295 The other new offense is that of solicitation of murder for hire. 296 It includes the elements of solicitation of murder, but has the additional element of a contract, agreement, understanding, or request for money or anything of value in connection with the procurement. 297 The sentence for this Class X offense is not less than twenty nor more than forty years. 298
B. Offenses Against the Person
Drug-Induced Homicide
The legislature created the new offense of drug induced homicide, which occurs when the victim dies as a result of partaking of any amount of a controlled substance that was manufactured or delivered in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. 299 The offense is a Class X felony that provides an imprisonment term of fifteen to thirty years in addition to the sentence authorized in the sentencing statute, or an extended term of thirty to sixty years.o
Offenses Against Senior Citizens and Children
The General Assembly showed its concern for older citizens by adding the offense of aggravated battery of a senior citizen, which is the knowing or intentional infliction of great bodily harm on, or permanent disabling or disfiguring of, a person sixty years of age or older. 30 1 This is a Class 2 felony, for which no probation, periodic imprisonment, or conditional discharge is allowed. 302 The legislature continued its efforts to protect the children of Illinois from sexual abuse. It added the offense of keeping a place of juvenile prostitution. 303 The statute provides enhanced sanctions for keeping a place of prostitution in which the prostitutes are under sixteen years of age but allows the affirmative defense of rea- [Vol. 21 sonable belief that the person was sixteen or older. 3 0 4 Also, the legislature amended the criminal sexual assault and the aggravated criminal sexual abuse statutes to add sexual penetration of a victim at least thirteen years of age but younger than eighteen, if the accused was seventeen years of age or older and was in a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to the victim at the time of the crime. 3°5 The Class A misdemeanor of permitting sexual abuse of a child, 3° which allowed prosecution of a parent or step-parent who knowingly allowed a child to be the victim of criminal sexual abuse or assault and who failed to prevent the act or its recurrence, was repealed. 30 7 Also, the Child Abduction Act, which formerly applied only to luring victims into vehicles, was expanded to include abduction of a child into a building, housetrailer, or dwelling place.308
Forfeiture Provisions
The legislature performed a major revision of the forfeiture provisions pertaining to sex crimes. Although the provision is substantively unchanged, the revision created a new code section for post-conviction forfeiture of property or profits connected with keeping a place of juvenile prostitution 3 0 9 and exploitation of a child, 310 as well as for the formerly-included offense of child pornography. 3 " ' One half the proceeds are to be deposited with the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund. 31 2 In addition, the legislature completely revised the forfeiture provisions of the obscenity statute 31 3 and established an Obscenity Profits Forfeiture Fund that will receive twenty-five per cent of the property forfeited. 31 4 Even before the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.,315 the legislature amended the obscenity statute to state specifically that it does not authorize prior restraint on allegedly obscene materials or performances. 316 Whether this version will survive due process challenges such as Sequoia Books remains to be seen.
Intimidation and Ethnic Intimidation
The offense of intimidation now includes threats by telephone, mail, or in person, 317 and ethnic intimidation now includes criminal trespass to residence and criminal trespass to real property. 318 
Home Invasion
The offense of home invasion now includes staying in another's home if there is knowledge or reason to know that others are present. 3 ' 9 The amendment also adds the affirmative defense of immediately leaving or surrendering to those lawfully present without attempting to cause or causing serious bodily injury to those present. 320
C. Offenses Against Property
Theft
Formerly there were only two classes of theft; 321 however, the legislature amended the statute to assign felony classifications that correspond to the value of the property stolen. 322 Although theft of three hundred dollars or less remains a Class A misdemeanor if not from the person, theft of property worth more than three hundred dollars and less than 1en thousand dollars is now a Class 3 felony. 32 3 For property worth less than three hundred dollars stolen from the person or property worth between three hundred and ten thousand dollars, the offense is a Class 3 felony; if the property is valued at more than ten thousand dollars and less than one hundred thousand dollars, the offense is a Class 2 felony; if the value of the property exceeds one hundred thousand dollars, the offense is a Class 1 felony. 324 The statute expressly requires the trier of fact to determine the property's value. 325 Also, the legislature created the offense of taking property that is in a law enforcement agency's custody when a representative of the agency explicitly has represented that the property is stolen. 326 
Criminal Damage to Property
The legislature enhanced the offense of shooting a firearm at a train to a Class 4 felony, regardless of the amount of damage. 327
D. Other Offenses
1. Gambling The gambling statute was amended specifically to exclude a "crane game" from the list of prohibited gambling devices. 328 
Interference with Public Contracts
The General Assembly enacted a series of new laws criminalizing interference with public contracts by contractors and public employees. 329 These include the prohibition of bid-rigging 330 and bid rotating 331 by contractors. Bid-rigging is a Class 3 felony, and conviction is a bar to bidding on public contracts in Illinois for five years. 332 Bid rotating is a Class 2 felony, conviction for which permanently bars bidding on public contracts in Illinois. 333 The new law also prohibits public officials from opening a sealed bid before the opening date, or disclosing information about a bid, a contractor, or bidding procedure that is not public information. 334 Any bidder who receives this information and does not report it to the Attorney General or the State's Attorney commits a Class A misdemeanor. 335 In addition, a public official commits a 325. Id. para. 16-1(c). 326. Id. para. 16-1(a)(5). 327. Id. paras. 21-1(l)(g), 21-1(2). 328. Id. para. 28-2(a)(3). A crane game is defined as a game of skill in which the prize is contained within the device and has a wholesale value of five dollars or not more than seven times the cost of playing the game, whichever is less. Id.
329. Id. paras. 33E-1 -33E-11. 330. Id. para. 33E-3. Bid-rigging is the knowing agreement with a competitor to submit, or not submit, a bid that will result in the contract being awarded to that person; this includes bids that are submitted with a price or term that is intended to make the bid unacceptable. Idi 331. Id. para. 33E-4. Bid rotating is the collusive submission of bids in a pattern that permits those who bid on projects to distribute the work amongst themselves. 
Cannabis Control Act
The legislature amended the Cannabis Control Act to include the new offense of cannabis trafficking, which prohibits intentionally delivering or causing another to deliver 2500 grams or more of marijuana. 347 Conviction mandates a minimum sentence of not less than twice the minimum term for other violations of the Act and not more than twice the maximum term; fine amounts also must be no less than twice the minimum nor more than twice the maximum amount authorized by the Act. 3 4
Controlled Substances Act
The trafficking provision of the Controlled Substances Act was amended to encompass the manufacture or delivery of such substances in any state or country.
34 9 In addition, the legislature created the Class X felony of manufacturing or delivering heroin, cocaine, morphine, or LSD in amounts greater than ninety-nine grams, with enhanced mandatory sentences ranging from nine to sixty years. 350 Mere possession of between fifteen and one hundred grams of the same substances remains a Class 1 felony, but with enhanced sentences from six to fifty years. 3 51 In addition, for possessing, manufacturing, or delivering over 99 grams of any of these substances, the maximum fine is the full street value of the substance. The legislature enhanced the lowest level of violation of the Controlled Substances Act from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony; a subsequent violation is now a Class 3 rather than a Class 4 felony. 35 3 Also, the maximum fine for a first violation of the Act was raised to $100,000 from $5000; the fine for subsequent offense is a maximum of $200,000. 3 -4 6. Motor Vehicle Code
The Motor Vehicle Code was amended to repeal the provisions, which were found unconstitutional, mandating driver's license rev-ocation for anyone convicted of certain sex offenses. 355 The amendment gives the Secretary of State discretionary power to impose, without a preliminary hearing, a one-year suspension or revocation upon a first conviction of the same offenses. 356 Subsequent offenses require a five-year suspension. 357 The amendment also changed any revocation in effect on December 31, 1988 to a suspension. 3 58 The Act extended the Secretary's authority to impose the one-year suspension or revocation for those convicted of a first offense of possession of more than five grams of a controlled substance or more than thirty grams of marijuana.
3 59 For subsequent convictions within five years, the license will be suspended for five years.3° Whether these changes will withstand constitutional challenges remains to be seen.
Environmental Protection Act
The statute of limitations for violations of the State Environmental Protection Act 361 is now five years from either the date of the discovery of the violation by those legally obliged to discover it, or the date the appropriate prosecuting agent learns of the offense. 362 
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than standing as a watershed in the development of substantive criminal law, the Survey year saw the Illinois Supreme Court continue its recent trend toward conservatism and a hardened stance of anti-crime, as well as develop a previously unseen unanimity toward that end. The court, for the most part, adhered to established standards of judicial review and, in nine of the fourteen decisions examined in this Article, unanimously reversed lower court decisions favoring the defense. Given that three currently sitting justices have announced plans to retire from the court following the 1990 elections, 363 the court's propensity for conservatism and unanimity is uncertain.
The legislature too exhibited a distinct desire to "get tough" on crime, as evidenced by the number of amendments that created new offenses or enhanced penalties, even for such innocuous "crimes" as littering. The legislature continues to respond to popular sentiment by enacting harsher sanctions for sex offenses, especially when the victims are relatively helpless, and for drug-related crimes. Given the temper of the times, there is little doubt that this trend will continue, notwithstanding the strains being placed upon the Illinois corrections system. a 4
364. See supra note 11.
